Putin addresses the Petersburg business summit on May 23.
In his recent column titled “Putin Blinked,” New York Times Columnist Thomas Friedman compares Nikita Khrushchev’s “blink” when faced with U.S. warships off of Cuba in 1962 to Vladimir Putin’s “blink” when confronted with U.S. sanctions and an interrelated world economy. Friedman concedes the asymmetry of the two events: the first avoided a nuclear holocaust; the second was, in his words, “the first case of post Cold War brinkmanship.” But in each case, there was a face-off between the West and Russia, and in both cases Russia backed off.
Here is Friedman’s account of the Putin blink written five days after the fact (italics are mine):
“The first flutter was pulling back his troops from Ukraine’s border and letting the election proceed. Interestingly, he chose to blink this out most directly at last week’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Russia’s annual conference to attract global investors. ‘We want peace and calm in Ukraine,’ Mr. Putin told the business executives. ‘We are interested that on our western borders we have peace and calm in Ukraine. … We will work with the newly elected structure.’”
Friedman should check his facts.
First, Putin did not “let the election proceed,” as Friedman claims. His separatist proxies openly shut down the election in the two areas of east Ukraine they controlled – Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. His Little Green Men failed to gain influence in other regions of Ukraine, despite their efforts to destabilize Kharkiv, Odessa, and Dnepropetrovsk. The separatists had no way of holding back the record turnout of enthusiastic voters on Sunday, May 25.
In sum, Putin’s proxies (and Friedman’s own paper now confirms a heavy Russian presence among them) did not let the election proceed in the areas they controlled, and Putin had no influence, one way or the other, in the rest of Ukraine.
Second, Friedman failed to read Putin’s comments at the Petersburg business conference on the Ukrainian election in full. They are the opposite of an endorsement. Instead, Putin argued that there was no need for an election because Viktor Yanukovich was still president, that a referendum and constitutional change must precede any election. (See my Poroshenko Elected Ukraine President; Putin Dodges Promise To ‘Respect’ Results).
Putin also declared that he will work with the newly elected “structure” (not president). Although on the day after his election, Poroshenko affirmed his desire to meet Russian leaders, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov still refers to Poroshenko as a “Kiev representative” rather than as the president-elect of all of Ukraine, according to a Globe and Mail report. Ukraine has placed as a precondition for talks that Russia formally recognize Poroshenko as Ukraine’s legitimate president. I suspect that getting Putin to formally recognize the new Ukrainian president will be akin to pulling teeth.
Third, Putin has indeed promised on a number of occasions, the latest being May 19, to withdraw troops from the border. But NATO reported that, as of May 28, much of the previously deployed Russian force remains in the vicinity of the border, despite some withdrawals.In fact, the Russian newspaper,Moskovsky Komsomolets, reports today that Russia has decided to leave its troops on the border “in light of the tragic events in Donetsk,” By this, they mean the repelled attack on the airport by Russian mercenaries. In other words, Russia cannot withdraw its troops because of the increased violence that it itself is causing! Talk about chutzpah.
Friedman fails to mention the increase in violence in east Ukraine following the election, despite Putin’s avowed desire “for peace and calm.” This violence has been promoted by the influx of truckloads of armed “volunteers” from Russia and ominously from Chechnya, which Ukrainian borders guards are desperately trying to halt. (See the Ukrainian interior ministry complaint to Russia).
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