The Russian military could use surprise factor against the Baltic States
Last week week the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence’s Department of Investigation assessed the threat to national security. Most of the attention was paid to Russia. According to intelligence officials, while it is not capable of starting a military conflict with NATO for the time being, it is intensively expanding its military forces.
Intelligence officials however state that “the likelihood of a conventional war in Lithuania’s immediate geopolitical area (the Baltic Sea area) remains relatively small at this time”. Major Albertas Daugirdas, chairman of the Vilnius branch of the Union of Lithuanian Army Volunteer Founders Reserves, was in “Savaitė” (the Week) studio in the LRT television, LRT.lt reported.
Maj. Albertas Daugirdas, chairman of the Vilnius branch of the Union of Lithuanian Army Volunteer Founders Reserves
LRT: What is a conventional war, which intelligence officials say the likelihood of is rather small?
Major Albertas Daugirdas: First of all it must be remembered that an assessment like this was made before entry into NATO. That means it was recorded in the White Book 10 years in advance. Therefore, after a certain period of time, we once again see a similar assessment from the aspect that you have pointed out. In military terms, that being, a conventional arms treaty, and even in the United Nations, it is defined as a register of conventional armaments that include tanks, armored vehicles, heavy artillery, fighter jets, helicopters, missiles and war ships.
And what has happened in the Crimea and what is happening now in eastern Ukraine, is that not a conventional war?
We are not entirely within the defined parameters of a conventional war, because there has been no conventional response. The Ukrainian forces have not retaliated in the conventional way.
But maybe here this a case where elections are very close and if a war begins, there may not be any elections at all?
In a sense that is where the truth lies – avoiding a large military conflict and resistance. However, if we are talking about the actual experience that we have, as of 1990 and especially 1991 and 1993, it was clearly stated what aggression is, what we have to do and when we should counteract it. And recently great laws were created in which any citizen can take action against an aggressor without waiting for any proof, neither from the president nor from the Ministry of Defense. While in Ukraine, there was not such an impression of clarity either in the legal framework or operative phase. They were lost; they did not expect such a course of action, because they also have a lot of problems in Kiev.
So what is this anti-terrorist operation?
It would seem that everything is going in the right direction except for the pace at which it is happening. Again we can take our own Lithuanian example where as soon as a threat arose after 8 January, the Supreme Council was busy taking measures to secure facilities. That escalated very quickly and in 1991 – 1992 spread to most energy facilities as security against the subversive actions that had started. So forces were used, not to beat off hostile elements from the facilities, but rather to protect the facilities so that they would not fall into hostile hands.
But in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine the so-called special purpose forces are being used. And in actual fact they, the so-called “Spetsnaz brigade”, who was in Chechnya, Georgia and now in the Crimea and Ukraine, are completely different. Does this mean that Russia is using them in completely different ways?
I’d say that Russia is learning a good lesson from its mistakes. Until the end of the First Chechen War there were an unusually large number of these mistakes at that time when they were using the Special Forces. And already in 1999 during the Second Chechen War Vladimir Putin indicated as much to his military forces – go back to the leaders of the resistance movements in the Baltic States and take a look at how our partisans were annihilated. With Georgia as you said, coming back to Chechnya, the difference was that they operated as a fully-fledged army. The Spetsnaz were armored convoys and wore various attire, because they were more free in their behavior and tactics. They seemed a little relaxed.
They were smoking in front of the cameras…
That’s right, there was some bravado. That’s also the psychological aspect of war – showing that they’re really “cool”. In the meantime, in the Crimea the whole world saw identically dressed soldiers, brilliantly equipped and armed to the teeth. They all behaved the same, held their weapons like professionals, behaved professionally, had radio contact, everything. The only thing missing was Western weapons. And so clearly, a qualitative step forward is obvious, as if etched on the palm of one’s hand.
NATO did not see this, the West did not see this. They were very calm about it. Did they misjudge it?
I would think that too much was done after the Cold War in attempting to get closer to Russia and incline it towards the West. And the proof was several years ago when Putin intensified improvement of the military, increased financing and attempted to introduce the relevant technology. He has bought drones from Israel because his own could not be manufactured with the required quality. He has tried to buy SUVs from Italy. We see now that he has not bought any Iveco SUVs, but if we compare the Italian SUV to the current Tigr, an SUV used by the Special Forces, they even look the same from the outside. Like the Chinese, he stole technology in a sense by copying and using it for his own purposes. It seems training centre equipment financed by Germany has now i come to a standstill although it is not clear at what stage. What is that for? We ourselves are paying for, financing and selling the technology.
I would like to come back to the report of the Second Department which states that “development of the aero-space defense facilities in the Kaliningrad region are potentially especially dangerous to Lithuania”. There is talk of “S-400” missiles. Doesn’t the threat of war exist then if we are talking already about missiles?
We need to step aside here a bit. How did NATO react to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, in the entire region? It was said that in order for NATO to carry out its mission effectively, it needs to defend its members in line with Article 5. It must rethink the speed of its reaction. In order for the speed of a reaction to a possible threat to be big, forces must be mobilized closer to NATO’s external borders. Some of our politicians in the meantime said sleep soundly there’s nothing to worry about. In Kaliningrad and by the way in Belarus, there are anti-aircraft defense systems and air-space monitoring systems that enable Lithuania and on the other side Latvia and Estonia to be enclosed in an anti-aircraft shield.
An anti-aircraft shield against NATO aircraft. In other words, no assistance, no military intervention would be possible as long as Russia’s and Belarus’s anti-aircraft defense is not counteracted. Furthermore, the Iskander tactical missiles on the ground are designed to destroy targets on the ground and are difficult to overpower even with “NATO member” technology. You would not have to physically enter our territory in order to destroy a target. What is more, by bringing in the Special Forces and using unconventional military elements, you can destabilise the situation in seconds. Russia cannot fight a war against NATO; itis not even ready to for the next 10 years. However, forced, driven into a corner it can use the surprise factor. That is one of the principles of war.
Lithuanian soldiers during drill
All of this then was being said 10 years ago. Is this what you wanted to say at the beginning of our conversation regarding the intelligence officials’ report?
It is a good reflection of NATO’s capability because it makes very clear that if NATO is targeted, there can be a rather powerful retaliation from which recovery will be difficult. But something else is lurking there. Do we really comprehend Russia’s training, preparations and progress which I was talking about? What I am saying is that neither NATO, at least in the public space, and neither Lithuania comprehend militarily the surprise, aggression and unpredictability of the Russian forces. And bear in mind just how much of it they have and what tools they use. We could wake up the next morning in a completely different world. And that is something that raises concern.
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