(James Sherr, is a fellow at the Russian and Eurasian program at London-based think tank Chatham House and a Western analyst on security issues in Ukraine and Russia)
Since Russian troops invaded and took over Crimea, Ukraine’s authorities have seemed largely helpless. The criticism is not easing since many expect that Russia may invade the mainland, citing Russian troops near Ukraine's northeastern borders and Russian President Vladimir Putin's claim that southeastern Ukraine is a traditionally Russian land.
James Sherr, a fellow at the Russian and Eurasian program at London-based think tank Chatham House and a Western analyst on security issues in Ukraine and Russia, is critical of the Ukrainian leadership’s weak response.
Like Russian President Vladimir Putin’s former adviser, Andrey Illarionov, Sherr believes that if Ukraine wants the West to defend it, the country should start defending itself more actively, including militarily.
Sherr also offers advice on what Kyiv, Brussels and Washington should to do to stop Russia and to defend Ukraine.
Kyiv Post: You recently stated that Vladimir Putin’s objective is to make Ukraine ungovernable and subordinate it. Does this view still hold now?
James Sherr: Yes, it does, and it has been borne out by events. One need only look at the official Russian blueprint for settling the crisis. It makes the composition of its government and its system of foreign relations subject to Russia’s consent. It includes a form of ‘federalisation’ that grants Ukrainian oblasts, amongst other powers, the right to conduct their own foreign relations. Accept that demand and you accept the creation of six or seven new Transnistrias on Ukrainian territory.
Secondly, Russia’s objectives are borne out by the damage inflicted on Ukraine months, in some areas years before the invasion of Crimea began, and the depth of this corrosive work has only become apparent in recent weeks. Effectively, Ukraine’s new authorities took over a state without a brain and without many functioning ligaments. Important records and means of communication were destroyed or compromised with Russian help during the final days of the (Viktor) Yanukovych regime. Over the years, the Armed Forces have been systematically plundered. Military (and civilian) command-and-control has been ruptured. The networks sustaining the old oligarchical structures of eastern Ukraine have been eroded by the joint work of the Yanukovych 'family,' local criminal structures and Russian GRU [Russian military intelligence] and FSB [Russia’s Federal Security Service]. As long ago as 2005 the latter entities began a systematic effort to finance and suborn Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and Ukraine’s Interior Ministry officers, and the cumulative damage has been considerable. So the new heads of SBU and Ministry of the Interior, as well as governors Ihor Kolomoysky and Serhiy Taruta are starting almost from scratch.
Third, Russian objectives are confirmed by the operations taking place at present: by the presence of hundreds of Russian special service officers who now operate out of uniform in eastern and southern regions. They not only conduct provocations and acts of brutality in their own right, but provide coordination and finance for ‘self-defence’ forces, some of which are Blackwater-type forces in disguise.
KP: By Blackwater-like, you mean private security firms?
I mean private security firms that, unlike their Western counterparts, not only have a contractual relationship with the state, but are subordinate to it and to the military chain of command. It’s hardly incidental that remnants of the [Ukraine’s former riot police units] Berkut who left the country have now reconstituted themselves as a security firm under the same name, headquartered in Moscow.
Finally, Russian objectives are confirmed by operations designed to intimate what might take place: by the massing of new rapid-reaction forces on Ukraine’s borders, long-range weaponry, and the odd raid here and there—all of it intended to maintain an atmosphere of apprehension and suspense about ‘what Putin will do next’.
The political aims seem perfectly clear: to make Ukraine ungovernable, to break it up de facto and de jure, to ensure that elections will not be nationalelections. If they succeed in these objectives, it will be impossible for today’s so-called ‘illegitimate’ government to legitimise itself or any democratically chosen successor. The economic aims are equally clear: to destroy macro-economic order and deny investors (and the IMF) the predictability they require for investment and assistance.
But when I spoke a month ago about Russian objectives, I did not anticipate the annexation of Crimea. I assumed that its occupation was simply a bargaining chip in the battle for Ukraine. This is a battle for Ukraine, indeed a war, but Crimea’s annexation has to change everybody’s calculus. Up to that point, everything that occurred was predictable. There was a coherent ‘normative basis’: military doctrines, foreign policy concepts, the ‘law on compatriots.’ There also were precedents and alleged precedents: Abkhazia, South Osetia, Kosovo. But there are no precedents for annexation, and Russia’s state documents on national security provide no ‘normative basis’ for it. In his speech to the Federal Assembly, Putin referred six times to Kosovo, but how is the independence of the one [becomes] a precedent for the annexation of the other?
And even where there are precedents, they are highly dubious. In 1999 NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia (and, for that matter, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war) were preceded by months of diplomatic activity (not to say ethnic conflicts) and in the former case by UN resolutions censuring [former Yugoslav leader Slobodan] Milosevic. Yet between the signing of the 1997 Russia-Ukraine State Treaty, which recognised Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and the departure of Yanukovych, Russia did not once challenge Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea in the UN or anywhere else. For 17 years, it saw no threat to Russian compatriots worth raising in any international forum. Yet now we are asked to believe that between 21 February and 18 March, a threat not only materialised, but assumed such a magnitude that annexation was the only appropriate response. If you believe that, you will believe anything. The only possible analogy with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo lies in is its alleged illegality. By drawing this parallel, is Putin acknowledging that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is illegal?
After March 18, all bets are off about conflict in this region.
Like Hitler, Putin says there will be no more annexations, but why not? There are other ‘Russian’ entities, like Transnistria, that have the same aspirations and other parts of Ukraine where ‘Russian compatriots’ face the same so-called threats from ‘radicals,’ ‘fascists’ and the West. Why should Russia’s ‘principled’ policy not apply there? As long as no force stands in Russia’s way, the possibility of further interventions and annexations will arise at any time of Moscow’s choosing.
KP: The legality of Russia’s annexation of Crimea is questionable, but the fact remains – Russia controls Crimea now. Will Putin stop there or he’ll go further into the south and east, trying to get a loyal or controlled government in Kyiv?
JS: You might think its legality is questionable. But it’s not questionable to the Ukrainian government, the European Union or the United Nations Secretary General. Who is going to recognise this annexation? Argentina? Maybe, but it hasn’t done so yet. China? It won’t.
Where will Putin stop? The answer is simple: when he achieves his objectives or when he is prevented from achieving them. A number of Ukraine’s Western partners understand this, but some do not. Many still put their faith in diplomacy, and until the middle of this month, diplomacy and the ‘threat’ of sanctions defined the West’s response. For many in our political and foreign policy establishments, diplomacy is a narcotic, and they cannot live without it. Alongside this dependency, other preoccupations have arisen. One is ‘de-escalation,’ as if what is required on our part is a form of ‘anger management.’ For Moscow, this is a very useful theme because it shifts the focus from what has happened today to what might happen tomorrow. It also puts as much of an onus on Ukraine as on Russia. We should recall the warnings issued to Poland by British and French envoys in the days before war broke out in 1939: ‘don’t provoke Germany.’ Once again, there are those in Europe who believe that Ukraine should restrain itself rather than defend itself.
Diplomacy is not a form of medication. It is a tool of policy. Until there is an objective, there is no policy. What is the West’s objective, the end state we want to achieve? Until we know the answer to that question, we should not be conducting diplomacy, not least with a country like Russia that knows what it wants, believes it knows how to get it and believes it is in a position of strength as well. Russia will change its policy when its power structures conclude that its present course is harming the country’s interests and their own. That will be the time for diplomacy.
KP: You are arguing that Ukraine and the West should respond with strength to Russian aggression. What do you think Ukraine and the West should do to keep Putin out of Ukraine?
JS: First, let us be clear about the objective, one that Ukraine and the West should share. It should not be to punish Russia, deserving of punishment as it is. It should be to revive Ukraine: to reconstitute the state, its sovereignty, control of its borders, its macro-economic stability, security services and armed forces, rebuild its institutions and, of course, do this on a democratic and rules-governed basis. That will punish Russia amply, because on this basis, it will fail in its primary objective: to subordinate Ukraine to its will.
Alongside this objective, we should redouble and consolidate our efforts to diminish our energy dependency on Russia: yours and ours. On the EU’s part, that means implementing and enforcing the provisions of the Third Energy Package, completing the steps (such as pipeline interconnectors) we have signed up to since 2007 and strengthening the instruments of the European Energy Community, of which Ukraine is a part. On Ukraine’s side, it means deep and sustained reform of the energy sector and internal energy markets. Only on this basis will Ukraine attract the investment it needs to develop its considerable indigenous hydrocarbon resources. And finally, we must take serious and considered (rather than showy or provocative) steps to revive NATO as a serious military instrument in Europe. At some point in this process, I suspect sooner rather than later, Russia’s elites and the Russian people will be forced to take stock of the economic and political consequences of their actions.
Sanctions matter. But they matter much more in the context of a strategy to revive Ukraine and re-establish security in east-central Europe. How does Russia profit if, in exchange for its recovery of Crimea, it loses Ukraine—not to say investor confidence, a strong rouble, a fair portion of its energy market and very possibly the South Stream pipeline as well? These are far more serious sanctions than asset freezes and visa bans. Even if the West’s measures prove half-hearted and disappointing, my sense is that we already have reached the point where a return to ‘business as usual’ is impossible. Sooner or later, Russia will feel this, and somebody in Russia will have to account for it.
Where Ukraine is concerned, Carlyle’s dictum deserves repeating for the umpteenth time: ‘If I am not for myself, who will be for me?’ As an outsider, I am baffled by the authorities’ failure to formally declare that a state of war exists. The Armed Forces and the country need to hear this. Ukraine has been attacked and invaded. Its assets and military bases have been seized, centres of power have been occupied, and its navy has been destroyed. Although the new authorities are becoming more decisive, there still is a perilous lack of clarity. To this day, I’m not sure that soldiers and their commanders know what is expected of them. Here, I am the first to agree that the West has not helped. It is time we stopped praising Ukraine for ‘exercising restraint’. Our message must be: ‘Ukraine has the right and obligation to defend its armed forces, its citizens and its territory, and in this it can count on our full support.’ Hesitation in Ukraine reinforces hesitation in the West and vice versa. Those who say, in so many words, ‘we should not be focusing on Crimea, only on the elections’ are doing untold damage to the country.
KP: Are you referring to Yulia Tymoshenko?
JS: Names don’t help here, and the folly I referred to is not confined to one person. But it is folly to suggest that the war can be set aside until a politically convenient moment arises. Ukraine did not start the war. The war has come to Ukraine.
KP: So, you agree with the view of Putin’s former adviser Andrey Illarionov who said that if Ukraine wants the West to defend it, Ukraine should start defending itself?
JS: Ukraine is getting assistance from the West now, more than most people realise, and it will continue to augment. But assistance will come much more readily if Europe sees that Ukraine is taking the hard and necessary steps—and not just military ones— to defend itself. More importantly, Russia needs to see that Ukraine will defend itself, whatever it takes.
This is not a soft power contest. War is a tool of policy, but it is also war, and as Clausewitz said, it has its own syntax. Economic and institutional reforms take time to work, and they won’t work if, by the time of the elections, half the country is transformed de facto into Novorossiya [lands north of the Black Sea incorporated into the Russian Empire by Catherine II]. Ukraine and the West have a few months to change the dynamic: not to prevail, mind you, but change the dynamic. If we do that, our struggle becomes easier, and Russia’s becomes more difficult. Russia’s strengths are short-term. Like Hitler, Putin fights short wars. He is a treacherously agile tactician who tries to gain strategic advantage from tactical steps. But in a prolonged contest with Ukraine and the West, Russia’s weaknesses will prove telling. The challenge is to get to that point. We need to reach what Churchill called ‘the end of the beginning.’ And we will do so only if Ukraine and the West raise their game.
It is frustrating that in these conditions of national emergency, some are still pinning their hopes on EU membership perspectives and MAP. These things are beside the point. Even if they were politically realistic, they would do nothing to help. In June 1940, the British War Cabinet declared: ‘Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France.’ Did that help France? Perhaps somebody in the Kyiv Post will draw a cartoon: one man drowning and another on the shore holding a document entitled ‘EU Membership Perspective.’ Ukraine needs tangible assistance and as quickly as possible. It will not be saved by grand gestures.
KP: What kind of help does Ukraine need from the West?
JS: On the economic side, Ukraine requires emergency financial assistance, and it will get it. Over the longer term, it requires a larger and more comprehensive package of support for stabilisation and structural reform. If on 25 May, the country elects a government committed to reform, it will get this assistance too.
On the political-military side, Ukraine needs a package of reinforcing and augmenting measures to reconstitute and strengthen basic communications, information security, intelligence, counter-intelligence and the system of state planning: the brain of the state, if you will. The ligaments of the state—armed forces, security services, administrative structures, the lines of authority, chains of command—need to be reinforced and in some cases rebuilt. All of this requires a mixture of material, technical and human support. What can be done immediately should be done immediately. What takes time should be done gradually and properly. The entire mechanism of NATO-Ukraine cooperation and bilateral military-to-military (and intelligence) cooperation, which functioned impressively until 2010, needs to be revived and upgraded. In North America and Europe, in and outside NATO and in and outside government, there is an impressive range of individuals who are willing to work alongside Ukrainian colleagues and share their expertise. Unlike economic stabilisation, measures of this kind cost millions of dollars, not billions of dollars. They don’t entail ‘boots on the ground,’ nor do they risk force-on-force confrontation with Russia. NATO needs to provide Ukraine with every measure of help consistent with Partnership for Peace, the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership and Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. The question of Article 5 does not, need not and cannot arise unless a member of NATO is attacked.
KP: So, it’s either Ukraine resists or it dies?
JS: You are being too dramatic. Ukraine will not die. I am confident that, one way or another, it will resist and survive. Until a short time ago, Ukraine’s new authorities were fumbling. They were shutting out too many people whose help they needed. Yet even within the past few weeks, one can sense a change of attitude and the first signs of cohesion. But it’s uneven. The country needs to see a spirit of urgency in all endeavours, the best people in the best positions and war on cronyism. In departments of state, there needs to be a kinetic, sparkling friction between inexperienced, but highly motivated new generation people and seasoned professionals, including younger ones who have energy, open minds and experience. This is happening too slowly, but it’s happening.
Russia won’t die either, but I am confident that it will lose. It does not understand this country. Even if it wins this round, it will lose. The Kremlin thought it won in December when Yanukovych signed the accord on December 17 [regarding Russian $15 billion loan package], and Putin’s cronies announced that ‘Ukraine is ours.’ Then in two months time, they found they had no influence in Ukraine at all. We now need to show Russia: you take Crimea, you lose Ukraine; you take more of Ukraine, you lose Europe. I think it’s eminently feasible.
Yuriy Onyshkiv is a former Kyiv Post staff writer.
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